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First handlers of agricultural commodities
encounter inseparable input-supply and product
disposal risks when buying and selling the
commodity. Uncertain supplies from farms
affect the proportion of expected production
a handler can safely forward contract to man-
ufacturers. A shortage of input supplies could
leave the handler unable to fulfill forward
contracts while a surplus of farm supplies
might cause product disposal difficulties in a
period of depressed prices.
Several authors have explored issues
related to first handler’s risk. Forward con-
tracting of a fixed quantity of a single com-
modity was examined under differing pricing
provisions [3]. Multi-period mean-variance
analysis has been applied to determine forward
contracting strategies with credit constraints
[1]. Non-linear input costs can make the
decision maker’s risk-aversion a determinant
of the recommended hedging ratio [2]. Other
research [12, 14, 21] has concentrated on
optimal hedging ratios with futures contracts.
A restrictive premise underlying the above
papers is production certainty [19], In parti-
cular, first handlers are concerned with pro-
duction uncertainty attributed to uncertain
input supplies.
Risk programming with uncertain input
supplies has concentrated on variations of
chance-constrained programming (CCP). CCP
is a method of protecting against insufficient
acquisition of essential inputs that have free
disposal [4, 22]. The magnitude of the CCP
safety margin, however, has not been linked
to the firm’s utility function [7]. Considerable
parametrizing must occur with CCP if uncer-
tain prices are also present.
A risk-programming formulation based on
sampling was recently presented [15]. The
formulation relaxed constraining assumptions
on the utility function and the distributions of
uncertain parameters. This paper presents a
methodological approach that allows simul-
taneous consideration of uncertain constraints
and variance in the objective function. A
multi-period stochastic programming method is
*This study was under the direction of Bill R. Miller, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.
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determine the ratio of domestic to export
peanuts that a peanut shelling firm should
contract with farmers. The firm’s uncertain
input supplies (the constraints), uncertain
prices received (the objective function), and
risk preferences are considered. An hypothesis
is advanced that limiting uncertain input suP-
plies increases business risk if the final prod-
uct is sold before the input is received.
Validity of the hypothesis is demonstrated
with a case study of peanut buying and
shelling.
Background
For an input supply to be considered
uncertain, two requirements must be met.
First, the input must have been purchased or
endowed at an earlier period but yield an
uncertain flow of services in the future pro-
duction period. Second, the firm must not be
able to purchase readily more of the input
during the production period. Rainfall, solar
radiation, and available field hours are tradi-
tional examples of farm inputs with uncertain
supplies.
Non-enforceable purchasing contracts are
associated with stochastically available inputs
for first handlers of agricultural products. A
non-enforceable contract is defined for this
study to be a contract in which the seller is
not required to deliver but the buyer is re-
quired to purchase the contracted commodity.
As will be shown later, the contract between
a peanut sheller and peanut farmers is of this
nature. Rarely are these terms explicit in
the contract. Some Canadian fisheries, sugar
beet cooperatives, and peanut shellers are
exceptions. However, act of nature clauses
may be considered implicit when dealing with
almost all natural commodities. For example,
if a heat wave or disease destroys a grower’s
chickens, a vertically integrated poultry firm
will suffer economic losses. A farm supply
firm may extend credit to farmers in drought
years rather than lose customers. Examples
can be found for most any firm, in which
non-delivery of a contracted input causes
economic losses to that firm. Farmers do not
necessarily cover ,any or all losses of the
first handlers,
During the future production period, the
amount acquired of such a stochastically avail-
able input is not a decision variable. Prior
to the production period, however, the firm
may initiate or react to events that influence
either the endowment or the firm’s future
requirements for that input. The influencing
factors are termed exogenous decision variables
(EDV) since exogenous events and decisions
occur prior to the production process. EDV
are determined prior to the production period
and are fixed during the production period.
For a commodity marketing firm, an example
of an EDV that affects the endowment and
that will be examined in this study is the
tonnage contracted with farmers. An example
of an EDV that affects future input require-
ments would be forward contracting of the
output to manufacturers. EDV are associated
with the long run risk and profit position of
the firm rather than with immediate production
decisions.
Forward contracting reduces price uncer-
tainty; however, forward contracting a large
proportion of expected future production in-
creases the risk associated with uncertain
input supplies. Five prominent factors in-
fluence the amount of an uncertain input to
contrack price uncertainty, input supply un-
certainty, the correlation between prices and
input supply, the firm’s risk preferences, and
the difference of expected cash price minus
the forward contract price (the expected
basis). A balance of these factors should be
determined. Research should be able to quan-
tify that in general, increased amounts of
uncertain inputs increase the uncertainty of
profits and that greater forward contracting
implies more risk associated with uncertain
input supplies for a risk-averse firm. The
technique presented next maximizes expected
utility while considering all five factors.
The Risk Management Technique
The distribution of profits in the pre-
sence of limiting uncertain inputs is not trans-
parent. Let Y be a stochastically available
input with a given probability distribution.
Profits, II, are a function of Y, random prices,
other non-stochastic inputs, and the EDV.
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on the distributions of Y and prices, the sto-
chastic variables. In typical mathematical
programming models price risk is reflected in
the primal objective function and input supply
risk is contained in the right-hand-side (rhs).
Assuming prices have a normal distribution,
the variance of profits in the presence of
only uncertain prices is a linear combination
of the squared prices. However, the path of
inputs from the rhs through the technical
matrix to the objective function presents a
more complicated formulation, The input sup-
ply must limit production to affect profits.
Furthermore, infeasible solutions might occur
at extreme input levels.
The goal is to determine the level of
the EDV that maximizes the firm’s expected
utility. Expected utility is a function of pro-
fits and the distribution of profit~
E(U) = KJ(m)F(m)dm Maximization of this
formula with respect to the objective function
variables, using facilitating premises, can be
achieved with quadratic programming [1O].
However, maximizing with respect to an EDV
requires a different approach. The approach
in this study employs the axiom that a con-
tinuous profit distribution can be approximated
by a discrete sampling procedure.
The optimization procedure requires sev-
eral components. A profit maximizing linear
programming (LP) model is needed which in-
corporates the time span and production acti-
vities influenced by input supply uncertainty.
Since the farm contracting decisions are made
prior to the production period, both input
supply and uncontracted prices must be con-
sidered stochastic. The parameters of the
probability distributions of input supply and
uncontracted prices are used to generate ran-
dom samples that could represent actual prices
and input supplies. If prices and input supply
are correlated, the generated sample values
can reflect this correlation [5, 20]. Finally,
the firm’s utility function with respect to
profits is required. Some firms may be con-
sidered to know or to describe their utility
functions while others can be estimated
through elicitation methods.
The steps in the technique were as fol-
lows. First, the EDV was set to a specific
level. A profit was determined using one
sample of the generated random prices and
input supply in the linear programming model.
Repeated solutions were then obtained with
the remaining random values until sufficient
sample profits were given to describe ade-
quately the profit distribution. One hundred
trials appeared adequate for the case stud~
one thousand trials did not change the dis-
tribution significantly. A discrete expectation
formuki, E(u) = ZU(T)F(m),was then applied to
the utility function and estimated profit sample
points to determine an expected utility for
that specific level of the EDV. All the pre-
vious steps were then repeated in a systematic
search of all levels of the EDV. An expected
utility for each EDV level was furnished and
a maximum determined. This expected utility
maximizing level of the EDV will likely differ
from the expected profit maximizing level of
the EDV.
The linear programming model and tech-
nique are useful for setting farm contracts
prior to production. However, after the sto-
chastic inputs are acquired, input supply will
no longer be uncertain. More conventional
methods such as mean-variance analysis could
be applied to the LP model to analyze the
effects of only uncertain prices.
An obstacle in this technique is the vol-
ume of linear programming tableaus that need
to be maximized. To overcome the computing
hurdles, the revised simplex algorithm using
the product form of the inverse [11] was
written in vectorized Fortran for use with a
CDC Cyber 205 computer. The Cyber 205 is a
supercomputer with hardware structure de-
signed for vector operations; it can operate in
excess of 400 megaflops (million floating point
operations per second). This algorithm and
computer proved to have the speed necessary
to do the iterations in a reasonable amount
of time. In the next section, the above ap-
proach is applied to determine the amount of
export peanuts a large peanut sheller should
contract to buy from peanut farmers.
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In-shell “peanuts are the major limiting
stochastically available input in a peanut
sheller’s production function. ‘Knowledge of
farm yields is necessary to formulate strategies
and plans for marketing and forward contract -
ing. However, annual yields have fluctuated
as much as 50 percent from average’ and. cur-
rent techniques for forecasting peanut yields
are not of sufficient accuracy for early-season
(prior to August) marketing analysis. Market-
ing decisions must be made with imperfect
information.
Current peanut program provisions require
a sheller to contract with farmers in order to
export peanuts. Further, the sheller usually
combines a farm contract to deliver additional
peanuts for export with a contract to deliver
quota peanuts for the domestic market. Re-
markably, the typical contract between a
sheller and a farmer states that the farmer is
not required under penalty to deliver the con-
tracted poundage of peanuts, In effect, farm-
ers are not penalized for being an uncertain
input supply. In fact, evidence indicates that
farmers may underplant on acreage needed to
fulfill the combined farm contract if export
prices are, low. The sheller, on the other
hand;, must purchase all the contracted peanuts
and, if profitable, will procure the remaining
peanuts produced by the contracted farms.
In-shell peanuts qualify as’an uncertain
input supply. The only established source of
in-shell peanuts is from US, farms since im-
ports are restricted, These peanuts are pur-
chased or endowed prior to the mandated
farm contracting deadline of July 31 but are
not delivered until after harvest in September.
Farm plantings, yields; and subsequent deli-
veries are unpredictable. The market among
peanut handlers for in-shell peanuts is insig-
nificant] peanuts purchased from othefihandlers
are already. shelled. ~ Excess capacity in the
shelling industry creates” a ciesi%e for each
firm to shell’!all the peanuts it handles.
,.. ” ‘,.,
Peanut .rnarkethg [8; J6, 47] and peanut
price discovery mechanisms [18] have been
documented. The Food Security Act of 1985
[9] continued a two-tiered pricing system with
domestic production quotas and import restric-
tions. According to price support policy, all
additional peanuts (contract additional or
uncontracted additional bought back for ex-
port) must either be exported, or crushed for
oil and meal. Only quota peanuts (farm quotas
or uncontracted additional bought back for
domestic consumption) may be sold domesti-
cally.
For this analysis, the marketing firm is
defined to include only the activities from the
farm purchases of in-shell peanuts to the
selling of shelled peanuts. The marketing
period for one year’s crop is approximately
fifteen months long and lasts from September
of the current year to November of the fol-
lowing year. The harvest season (September-
December) is the period when farm deliveries
are ordinarily made. During the first months
of the following year (January-August) in-
shell peanuts must come from storage. These
dates may change by a week or two depending
on the location of the sheller and when the
peanuts are harvested.
An appropriate model of the flows of
peanuts through the firm and the time of
their occurrence can be achieved through
linear programming techniques. The model [6]
was designed specifically to analyze risk in
farm contracting and represented the major
activities and constraints of a peanut sheller.
A more disaggregate analysis of daily plant
operations would not assist in the long range
planning arena in which most major risk deci-
sions are made.
The model was a multi-period multi-prod-
uct planning model with a one crop year hori-
zon. The combination of farm production,
forward contracts, open market sales, and
farm purchases of shelled peanuts that maxi-
mize the firm’s marketing margin with regard
to the 1986-87 peanut program was determined.
The non-stochastic technical matrix consisted
of only i-l, O, or -1 to represent the flow of
peanuts through the firm. Old and future
crops were connected in this model through
the beginning and ending inventories.. The
model assumed that the firm will have peanuts
on-hand from the previous crop and might
not sell all of the current crop during the
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divest the beginning inventory by November
because of an export deadline on additional
and the expiration of aflotoxin insurance on
domestic peanuts. Storage between crop years
is not an option.
Shellers typically forward contract a
proportion of the next crop and sell the re-
mainder by cash sales. Forward contracts in
this study were limited to be shelled peanuts
sold to manufacturers or other handlers before
September 1 but delivered in September
through December or in January through
August. Cash transactions were shelled pea-
nuts both contracted and delivered within one
of these periods. These strict definitions may
not precisely match those of shellers; however,
the definitions reflect the risk in forward
contracting from input supply. No input sup-
ply risks are in contracts made after harvest.
After harvest (in January through August),
the sheller sells only peanuts on-hand.
The objective function was arranged into
four major sections. The export market, the
domestic market, buybacks, and purchases of
farm peanuts sections have a total of 42 acti-
vities (endogenous variables). The domestic
market activities correspond to those in the
export market. However, prices will be sig-
nificantly higher and constraints on quotas
differ from those on additional. Therefore,
another set of activities was included. Also,
risk in peanut marketing is centered on export
peanuts with respect to price variability and
input supply uncertainty.
The export and domestic markets for
shelled peanuts deal with sales and purchases
among handlers and final sales to manufac-
turers. In the model, export and domestic
peanuts can each be sold four ways, either
for cash or by forward contract for delivery
in either September through December or Jan-
uary through August. Further, by law, exports
must be shipped by November. Thus, the
sheller may face losses on any old crop export
inventory that is on hand after August of the
year following harvest.
Buy-ins (an industry term) were shelled
peanuts purchased only from other domestic
peanut handlers and were analogous to sales
above. Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
redemptions were considered as January
through August cash buy-ins, The CCC sells
peanuts placed into the Loan (uncontracted
farm quotas and additional) from January
until June at competitive bids that are highly
correlated to the open market price paid to
other handlers for similar peanuts.
Quotas are domestic marketing limits for
farmer’s stock peanuts, not sheller marketing
limits. The sheller can market more domestic
quota peanuts than were purchased from its
contracted growers. The buyback option al-
lows sellers to pay quota prices for uncon-
tracted additional peanuts in the CCC loan,
thereby converting them into quota peanuts
which can then be sold for domestic consump-
tion. Three buyback activities were modeled
depending on other actions of the firm and
the final use of the buybacks.
Farmers produce peanuts classified three
ways by the peanut program and deliver them
to shellers in the most profitable order. First,
domestic quota peanuts with a high support
price (above free market equilibrium) are de-
livered. These are followed by contracted
additional (export) peanuts with a lower price
(near international free market levels). Last
to be delivered are uncontracted additional
which must go into the CCC loan program
(below world price levels) but can be immedi-
ately bought back (redeemed from the loan)
for either domestic use or export. Uncon-
tracted additional for buybacks are rare after
a drought year.
A distinct feature of peanut buying is
that contracted, expected, and actual farm
deliveries are not equal, Farmers tend to be
risk-averse and produce additional peanuts
primarily to be assured of making their quota.
However, if additional are not profitable for
farmers, they may underplant for delivery on
the combined contract. No penalty exists for
farmer underplanting but a market and price
are guaranteed for most of any excess peanuts
produced. Thus, shellers expect to purchase
less than the amount they contract with farm-
ers. Actual farm deliveries are a function of
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ed.
The contract between a sheller and farm-
ers usually stipulates that for every ton of
quota peanuts the sheller purchases, the shell-
er will also take some amount of additional
peanuts. Ratios of 3 to 1, 2 to 1, 1.75 to 1,
1.5 to 1, and 1 to 1 have been widely used in
the industry. For example, with a 3 to 1
contract, for every three tons of quotas con-
tracted, the sheller will also take one ton of
additionals. The I to 1 will likely cause
sheller losses during a high yield year. Alter-
nately, a 3 to 1 contract will likely cause
sheller losses during a low yield year.
Table 1 illustrates the effects of different
contract ratios on peanut deliveries for five
contract ratios for average, high, and low
farm yields. The sheller is able to contract
75,000 tons of quotas. The contract ratio
then decides the amount of contracted addi-
tional the sheller must take. A higher con-
tract ratio implies fewer contracted additional.
From the case study firm’s experience, farmers
usually underplanted acres 20 percent below
contract levels. This caused uncontracted
additional peanuts to be rare. In a high yield
year, the sheller would acquire more than the
expected amount of contracted additional; a
high contract ratio might be best. In a low
yield year, the sheller may receive no con-
tracted additional and may have a shortage
of quotas; a low contract ratio might be best.
Farm deliveries of the three types of
peanuts created three stochastic input supplies
in the rhs. Total farm production was not a
sheller decision variable and was assumed to
have a normal yield distribution for a given
acreage planted. Based on the delivery order
of peanuts, a separate algorithm was created
to apportion farm production into input sup-
plies of quotas, contracted additional, and
uncontracted additional.
The sheller was required to purchase all
contracted additional and quota peanuts, Un-
contracted additional could be used as buy-
backs if profitable or left with the CCC if
unprofitable. These buybacks were limited to
be less than the farm production of uncon-
tracted additional. The farm purchases sec-
tion of the tableau is presented in Table 2 as
an example of the coefficient structure of the
model,
After the farm peanuts were purchased,
two constraints accounted for delivery to the
shelling plant. Two constraints directed un-
contracted additional peanuts into the three
buyback activities. Four constraints equalized
the flow of peanuts within the firm between
time periods. Two constraints set the level
of beginning inventories of export and domes-
tic peanuts. Two constraints transferred be-
ginning inventories to later periods. Two
constraints set limits on ending inventories.
The supply of in-shell peanuts was the
major constraint to firm expansion; however,
several other limits were set on the expansion
of the firm and its ability to buy and sell
peanuts. A plant capacity constraint was
included although shelling plants tend to have
large excess capacity. A capacity constraint
would be limiting only after a high farm pro-
duction year, Shellers also face a major im-
plicit limit on their ability to expand opera-
tions. The concentrated structure of the pea-
nut industry (Miller) is such that large firms
cannot exceed their market share of domestic
production without facing a reaction from
other firms such as a destructive price war.
Consequently, domestic farm purchases were
limited to the amount of quota peanuts that
the sheller normally deals with in a given
year.
The amount of open market transactions
was limited by the peanuts available for open
market transactions at prevailing prices. Pea-
nuts for buy-ins are scarce and expensive
during a drought; in a high yield year buy-ins
are available but not needed. Thus, two con-
straints limited the amount of shelled buy-ins
that a sheller can expect to be available at
usual price levels to be less than 10 percent
of the actual farm production. The 10 percent
was at the suggestion of a case study firm.
Drought buy-ins with higher prices were un-
limited.
Similarly, in a high yield year shellers
will have an excess of peanuts to sell and
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Relationship of Contracted, Expected, and Actual Yields,
Georgia, 1986 (All peanuts are in shelled tons*)
Contract ratio 1.00 1.50 1.75 2.00 3.00
Contracted Farm Production
contracted quota 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000
contracted additional 75,000 50,000 42,857 37,500 25,000
total contracted 150,000 125,000 117,857 112,500 100,000
ExDected Farm Production
percent underplanted 20 20 20 20 20
expected yield/acre 1,1306 1.1306 1.1306 1.1306 1.1306
expected total acres 106,136 88,447 83,393 79,602 70,757
expected total yield 120,000 100,000 94,286 90,000 80,000
uncontracted additional o 0 0 0 0
contracted addi.tionals 45,000 25,000 19,286 15,000 5,000
contracted quotas 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000
Actual Farm Production with a Hiph Yield
actual yield/acre 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300
total yield 137,977 114,981 108,410 103,483 91,985
uncontracted additi.onals o 0 0 0 0
contracted additional 62,977 39,981 33,410 28,483 16,985
contracted quotas 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000
Actual Farm Production with a Low Yield
actual yieldjacre 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750
total yield 79,602 66,335 62,544 59,701 53,068
uncontracted additional o 0 0 0 0
contracted additional 4,602 0 0 0 0
contracted quotas 75,000 66,335 62,554 59,701 53,068
additional shortfall 70,398 50,000 42,857 37,500 25,000
* 1 ton of in-shell peanuts equals 3/4 ton of shelled peanuts.
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Estimated Covariance Matrix of Prices and Yield,
Georgia, 1986
xl x2 x3 x4 x5
xl 126
x2 205 410
x3 o 0 47
x4 o 0 61 100
X5 -0.38 -0.634 -o. 043 -0.055 0.0139
where: xl - Export cash prices Sept-Dec
x2 - Export cash prices Jan-Aug
x3 - Domestic cash prices Sept-Dec
x4 - Domestic cash prices Jan-Aug
x5 - Farm yield/acre in shelled ton equivalent
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peanuts will be filled. Selling increasing
amounts of peanuts becomes progressively
more difficult. All shellers will be competing
for a smaller market. Again, following the
experience of a case study firm, two con-
straints limited open market sales of peanuts
to be less than 10 percent of expected deliv-
eries.
The amount of export peanuts forward
contracted to each period was defined to be
the proportion of expected farm deliveries of
additional peanuts in a shelled equivalent mea-
sure. Analogous constraints were imposed on
domestic forward contracting. The empirical
example is presented next.
Data
The above model and risk management
technique were applied to a large sheller with
1986-87 peanut program regulations and price
and yield expectations. The majority of the
data was provided by a case study firm, while
the remainder was estimated from industry
publications. Parameter estimates were both
historical and subjective in nature.
Each activity in the objective function
of the model required a price estimate. Ex-
pected prices of forward contract and cash
sales for both export and domestic peanuts
along with other nonstochastic prices were
elicited from the marketing personnel of the
case study firm. The responses were in May
and an early season drought was apparent.
No transactions were allowed to occur below
the shelled equivalent support prices, although
the expected market prices were significantly
above the support prices.
Subjective estimates of the variances
and covariances of prices [13] were formulated
with information garnered from the case study
firm. The overall covariance matrix (Table 3)
included stochastic prices and farm yields.
Farm yield was based on historical data. The
expected yield per acre was 1.131 tons shelled
equivalent with a standard error of 0.11768
tons shelled equivalent. For a large sheller
with contracted farmers located over a wide
area, a negative correlation exists between
farm yield and prices. The covariances be-
tween prices and farm yield were estimated
with time series data.
No correlation was assumed to exist be-
tween export and domestic prices. The domes-
tic and export price determination factors
appear independent. The export equilibrium
was determined by international supply and
demand factors. The domestic market was
largely governed by the support price and
production quota. Export prices varied more
than domestic prices (Table 3) suggesting that
export price risk is greater than the domestic
price risk, January through August prices of
the year after harvest varied more than Sep-
tember through December prices of the current
year. This reflected both the thinness of the
peanut market in January through August and
the inability to forecast prices accurately
farther into the future,
The negative exponential function,
u= 1-exp(- $ * profits), [10] was a close re-
presentation of and was substituted for a
concave utility function provided by the re-
search department of the case study firm. A
vital characteristic was that the managers
received little additional satisfaction from
profits above a target level. Thus, the risk-
aversion coefficient, @, was set at 8*10-7.
With this risk aversion coefficient, 99 percent
of maximum utility is reached at $5.6 million.
This was within the range of the firm’s target
profit.
All data, with the possible exception of
the utility function, are commonly known and
used by the management of peanut shelling
firms in long range planning operations. Data
collection should not be difficult for a shelling
firm desiring to apply this model.
Results
Compared to many common limiting in-
puts, sheller profits were not a monotonic
function of total farm production. Thus, the
sheller had a two-sided input supply risk. To
maximize profits, the sheller must receive at
least but no more than its expected farm pro-
duction plus the amount above this that it
can readily sell without discount. Any devia-
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fits. In fact, the case study sheller experi-
enced lower profits after the record high
farm production year of 1985 than after the
major 1980 drought.
An initial stochastic analysis omitted
input supply risk. Farm deliveries were fixed
at expected levels but sales prices were al-
lowed to vary. The generated profit distribu-
tion appeared symmetric and was not rejected
as a normal distribution using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov modified D statistic (D = 0.097 with
n = 100). Inclusion of uncertain farm deliver-
ies, however, visibly skewed the distribution
to left; it was rejected as a normal distribu-
tion (D = 0.184). The sheller had possibilities
of large losses without proportionate possibili-
ties of large gains. Additionally, the disper-
sion of profits was greater with the inclusion
of uncertain farm deliveries.
The optimal amount of shelled peanuts
to forward contract to manufacturers for ex-
port and domestic use to both September
through December and January through August
was then investigated. The results suggested
in all cases that no forward contracting gives
the maximum expected utility. With an im-
pending drought these results appear rational.
Prices were expected to rise and the firm
should not have been locked in at current low
forward contract offers.
The final procedure was to determine
which of the various contract ratios would
maximize the firm’s utility. Five levels of
the contract ratio formed an EDV. The LP
model was run 100 times for each of the ratios
with no forward contracting to manufacturers,
A profit distribution and, subsequently, an
expected utility were calculated. With a 1,75
to 1 or lower contract ratio, the farmers al-
most always made their quota.
As indicated in the top line of Figure 1,
the 2 to 1 ratio had the highest expected
utility. At a 2 to 1 contract ratio, for every
two tons of quotas contracted, the sheller
must take (if the farmers deliver) one ton of
additional. Not surprisingly, a 2 to 1 con-
tract ratio was very common at the time of
this study.
At the higher 1 to 1 contract ratio, the
sheller would suffer losses during a high yield
year; farmers would force the sheller to take
large amounts of additional peanuts at a time
when the market was saturated and the sheller
had no prearranged buyers. As indicated
above, the sheller would have disposal prob-
lems. The expected utility of a 3 to 1 con-
tract ratio was slightly lower than the 2 to 1
ratio. With a 3 to 1 ratio, the sheller would
have fewer additional peanuts to sell. Conse-
quently, sheller profits would be lower.
The analysis was repeated except that 20
percent of both the quota and additional pea-
nuts were forward contracted to manufacturers
(i.e., 10 percent of quotas to January through
August and 10 percent of quotas to September
through December). These peanuts have essen-
tially been sold before being received. The
lower line in Figure 1 shows that a 1.75 to 1
contract ratio has the highest expected utility.
The expected utility of a 3 to 1 ratio
dropped comparatively more than the other
ratios. The 3 to 1 ratio would provide an
inadequate cushion of additional since farmers
may have few additional during a drought
year. With 20 percent of the additional for-
ward contracted to manufacturers, the sheller
would have to enter the open market during a
period of possibly high prices. The expected
utility of the 1 to 1 and 1.5 to 1 ratios
changed only slightly. Most of the change
for these ratios was from forcing the sheller
to take a lower forward contract price.
Conclusions
Based on the above results, one might
conclude that input supply risk is greater
with a higher contract ratio. Farmers produce
a smaller amount of contracted additional
with the higher contract ratio. Input supply
uncertainty also presents greater risk if the
peanuts are sold prior to their acquisition.
The expected utility dropped after 20 percent
of the shelled peanuts were forward contracted
to manufacturers.
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The study has yielded an analytical tool
that can evaluate management decisions in the
presence of both uncertain prices and input
supplies. The technique may also be applied
at other levels in the food marketing chain to
determine long-run marketing and production
strategies with uncertain limiting inputs. The
uncertainty of peanut supplies to shellers was
demonstrated in this study.
Sampling was combined with linear pro-
gramming to describe a profit distribution.
The distributions of the stochastic parameters
were explicit, and no a priori restrictions
were compulsory on the functional form of
the utility function. An expected utility was
then determined with the profit distribution.
This approach accounted for the effects of
uncertain input supplies on the distribution of
profits.
The farm contract, in effect, shifts the
farm yield risk from peanut farmers to shell-
ers, In most other contracts, the seller would
be the one required to buy the commodity on
the open market to overcome a shortage of
production. However, with peanuts, the sheller
must enter the open market to overcome a
farm shortage of peanuts. Input supply risk
reducing approaches, such as inventories car-
ried between years and yield forecasting, are
not feasible options for shellers. Policy
changes could create new marketing alterna-
tives to mitigate< input supply risk. Examples
might be eliminate the farm contracting
deadlines, or simply require farmers to deliver
on the contracts. Until changes occur, shell-
ers should take a moderate approach to setting
the contract ratio.
Uncertain supplies of limiting inputs are
elemental sources of risk in agriculture. This
study has given some insights on modeling
Journal of Food Distribution Research February 88/page 47uncertain input supplies and a technique that
can be extended to other situations. As gov-
ernment farm policies trend toward reducing
excess production, the issue of uncertain input
supplies will appreciate in significance for
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